We investigate a model in which one seller and one buyer trade in each of two periods. The buyer has demand for one unit of a non-durable object per period. The buyer's reservation value for the good is private information and is the same in both periods. The seller commits to prices in each of two periods. Prices in the second period may depend on the buyer's first-period behavior. Unlike the equal discount factor case studied in earlier papers, we show that when the seller is more patient than the buyer, second-period prices increase after a purchase. In particular, the optimal dynamic pricing scheme is not a repetition of the optimal static pricing scheme.
Introduction
With reductions in the price of computing and data storage, it is not difficult for firms with millions of customers to keep track of past buying behavior of each customer. Grocery stores offer customers discount coupons that are tailored to their purchasing history. Netflix and Amazon use purchase history to send product suggestions and other marketing messages to their clients. It is eminently feasible for these firms to use historical information to offer customer-specific prices.
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We investigate the pricing problem of a firm when it sells a non-durable product to a buyer who wishes to purchase one unit of the good in each of two periods. The buyer's second-period demand remains one unit whether or not he buys in the first-period.
2 Because of the seller's ability to recognize past customers and recall their buying decisions, second-period prices can depend on the first-period decision of the buyer. The buyer's reservation value for the product is (i) known only to the buyer and (ii) remains the same in each period. The seller announces a price in each period and the buyer decides whether or not to buy. The buyer is strategic: he takes into account that his first-period purchase decision can affect second-period prices. The seller commits to second-period prices at the beginning of the first period.
Several authors have investigated models of behavior-based price discrimination, both with commitment by the seller and without. Hart and Tirole (1988) , Villas-Boas (2004) , and Acquisiti and Varian (2005) have shown that in a dynamic-pricing setting where the buyer's valuation takes on one of two possible values but is fixed and privately known, it is in the seller's interest to commit not to use in later periods information revealed by the buyer's earlier decisions. An optimal multiperiod pricing strategy for a seller who can commit is to simply offer the same take-it-or-leave-it price each period.
3
Our contribution is to show that the optimality to commit not to use the information revealed via the buyer's purchase decision hinges upon the assumption of equal discount factors. If, instead, the seller is more patient than the buyer, then her optimal pricing strategy with commitment exploits information learned in the first period; in particular, the second-period price increases after a sale in the first period. The second-period price charged by a less patient seller is also history-dependent; in fact, the seller obtains prepayment of the second-period unit in the first period. However, the less patient seller model is similar to the equal discount factors model in that the subset of types of buyers who trade is the same under both scenarios.
To our knowledge, the only other paper in which a less informed party commits to use information revealed in a dynamic game is Sobel and Takahashi (1983) . We discuss this model in section 3.
If the seller and the buyer can borrow money at the same interest rate, then the assumption of equal discount factors is appropriate. But this assumption is not tenable when the seller is a large retail establishment and the buyer is an individual or a household, as in the examples presented above. Often, the seller is more patient than the buyer.
The optimal pricing strategy of a seller who cannot commit has been investigated in models with equal discount factors in Hart and Tirole (1988) , Villas-Boas (2004) , and Acquisiti and Varian (2005) . See also Skreta (2006) and surveys by Armstrong (2006) and Fudenberg & Villas-Boas (2006) . The pricing strategy is history dependent with the second-period price equal to the optimal take-it-or-leave-it price for the seller's updated distribution over buyer valuations. With unequal discount factors, the optimal pricing strategy is qualitatively similar. Therefore, except in an example where the no commitment case is introduced for comparison, we restrict our analysis to a seller who has the ability to commit.
In the next section, we describe the model and present the main result. The proof is in the appendix. We conclude with a comparison of the optimal contract in this model with the optimal contract for the sale of one unit.
The Model and Main Result
A buyer wishes to buy one unit of an indivisible, non-durable good in each of two periods. The seller's belief about the buyer's valuation v is represented by c.d.f F (v) which has positive density f (v) when v ∈ [a, 1], 1 > a ≥ 0. We assume that F is regular, i.e., v − (1 − F (v))/f (v) is increasing. The buyer's valuation remains v in each period, and the seller's cost is 0. The seller posts prices and the buyer accepts or rejects. The buyer is strategic: he takes into account the impact of his first-period decision on second-period prices.
Let the price in the first period be p 1 and the price in the second period be p 2 [p A buyer with valuation v chooses among not buying at all, buying in the first period only, buying in both periods, and buying in the second period only:
We are interested in non-negative prices p 1 , p 2 , p n 2 ≥ 0 that maximize the seller's expected profits. The analysis depends on whether the seller is more patient than the buyer, δ s > δ b , or not, δ s ≤ δ b .
Let v c represent the valuation of a marginal first-period buyer. If v c ∈ (a, 1), then a buyer with valuation v c is indifferent between buying or not buying in the first period. Therefore,
It is easy to see that any buyer with valuation v > v c will buy in the first period, and any buyer with valuation v < v c will not buy in the first period. Let
if there exists such a p
for all p ∈ [a, 1] and define p * = a. 4 The assumption that F is regular guarantees uniqueness of p * . It is well known (see references in the Introduction) that when δ s = δ b it is optimal for the seller to commit to prices p 1 = p 2 = p n 2 = p * . This strategy involves no behavior-based price discrimination in the second period. We show below that this is an artifact of the assumption of equal discount factors. We proceed by way of an example.
Suppose that F is uniform on the unit interval. Then, p * = 0.5 and p 1 = p 2 = p n 2 = 0.5 is optimal if δ s = δ b . Call this the no-price-discrimination strategy. The seller's expected profit from the no-price-discrimination strategy is Π (whether or not δ s = δ b ). Consider as an alternative a price-discrimination strategy in which the second-period price depends on first-period behavior: p 2 = 0.5 + 2 δ b , p n 2 = 0.5 − 2 (1 − δ b ), and p 1 = 0.5, where > 0 is small. The marginal firstperiod buyer's value is v c = 0.5 + 2 δ b , which is equal to p 2 . Compared with the no-price-discrimination strategy, this price-discrimination strategy reduces the probability of a first-period sale by 2 δ b and, as the first-period price remains 0.5, also reduces the seller's first-period expected revenue. In exchange, the price-discrimination strategy increases second-period expected revenue because the ex ante probability of a second-period sale increases by 2 (1 − δ b ) and, as the following calculation shows, the second-period expected price (conditional on a second-period sale) also increases:
where the inequality holds for small enough > 0. None of these calculations depend on the value of δ s . However, the postponement of profit from firstperiod to second-period is profitable for the seller only if she is more patient than the buyer. To see this, note the seller's expected profit from this pricediscrimination strategy is
for small enough. The optimal strategy need not be this price-discrimination strategy; the point of the example is merely to show the non-optimality of the no-price-discrimination strategy when the seller is patient.
Proposition 1(i) below shows that for any regular distribution F , the optimal pricing strategy involves behavior-based price discrimination when δ s > δ b . Before stating the proposition, we prove a preliminary result.
If p n 2 > v c then a buyer who does not buy in the first period will not buy in the second period; reducing p n 2 to equal v c gives the same expected profit to the seller. Therefore, without loss of optimality, we restrict attention to p n 2 ≤ v c . The following lemma provides restrictions in any optimal strategy for any value of δ s and δ b .
Lemma 1: In any optimal solution:
Proof: (i) Suppose that prices p 1 , p 2 and p n 2 are such that v c = 1. Then with probability one there is no sale in the first period. Therefore, in the second period p n 2 = p * is optimal and the seller's expected profit is δ s p
Therefore, consider the case a = 0. If v c = 0 then, as p 2 , p n 2 ≥ 0, we must have p 1 = 0; with probability one there is sale in the first period and in the second period p 2 = p * is optimal. Thus, if v c = 0 then the seller's expected profit is at most δ s p
We first prove that p n 2 > 0. Suppose that there is no sale in the first period. Clearly, p n 2 < a cannot be optimal as p n 2 = a does not decrease the probability of second-period sale. Thus, if a > 0 we are done. Next, suppose that a = 0. By (i), v c > 0. Then p n 2 = 0 yields zero expected profit whereas a price p n 2 ∈ (0, v c ) yields positive expected profit.
and (1) implies that the marginal buyer is strictly better off buying in the first period at price p 1 . Contradiction. Thus, if v c > p 1 then p 1 > p n 2 . As p n 2 > 0 we have p 1 > 0.
Our main result identifies the set of optimal pricing strategies for all values of δ s and δ b .
Proposition 1: The optimal commitment prices p 1 , p 2 , p n 2 are as follows.
If δ s = δ b , then the optimal prices are unique.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix.
When the seller and the buyer do not have the same discount factor, the second-period prices are history dependent. In particular, if the seller is more patient, δ s > δ b , equilibrium prices differ markedly from the equal discount factor case that earlier papers have focused on. If there is a purchase in the first period, then the second-period price increases and exceeds p * , the optimal commitment price in the equal discount factors case. If there is no purchase in the first period, then second-period price decreases and falls below p * . The first-period price p 1 may or may not exceed p * . Thus, the postponement of profit from the first-period to the second-period involved in this strategy (when compared to the optimal history-independent strategy of always charging p * ) is profitable for the patient seller regardless of the distribution F . Moreover, because the second-period price is history dependent, the marginal first-period buyer has a positive surplus (v c > p 1 ).
If the seller is less patient, δ s < δ b , the set of valuations of buyers who trade is the same as when δ s = δ b . The seller either sells one unit in each period (if the buyer's valuation exceeds v c = p * ) or none (if v < p * ). However,
* is not optimal. Instead, in the first period the seller obtains pre-payment for the second-period unit from a buyer with valuation v > p * . Because the buyer's discount factor is used to calculate the pre-payment, the seller is strictly better off with p 1 = p * + δ b p * and p 2 = 0 rather than with p 1 = p 2 = p * while the buyer is indifferent between the two sets of prices. In a sense, the difference in discount factors creates an arbitrage opportunity for the seller.
5
When the seller and the buyer have equal discount factors, there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices, all payoff equivalent for the seller and for the buyer. Earlier papers have identified one of these optimal prices, p 1 = p 2 = p n 2 = p * , which is the only history-independent optimal price in this case. It is well-known that a take-it-or-leave-it price equal to p * each period is an optimal mechanism when discount factors are equal. This follows directly from Myerson (1981) . Proposition 1 establishes that a take-it-or-leave it price of p * is not an optimal mechanism when δ s = δ b . However, whether the prices identified in Proposition 1(i) and 1(ii) constitute an optimal mechanism when δ s = δ b is an open question.
We illustrate the proposition with an example.
5 Note that we assumed that prices are non-negative. If instead, one assumes that prices must be greater than a negative number −k, k > 0, then the equilibrium prices will be
, which increases linearly with k. Of course, as k increases it becomes more difficult for the seller to credibly commit to price p 2 = −k.
Example: v is uniform on [0, 1] For this distribution p * = 0.5. If δ s > δ b then equations (6) through (10) in the proof of the Proposition yield the following solution: It is instructive to compare these prices to optimal prices for a seller who does not have the ability to commit. In the no-commitment case denote the optimal prices by p 1 , p 2 , and p n 2 and the marginal buyer's valuation by v c . Then
Further, p n 2 = 0.5v c , p 2 = v c , and v c > p * = 0.5. The table summarizes the optimal prices and profits at the discount factors considered above. Not surprisingly, the seller does better when she is patient and/or can commit. In both the commitment and no-commitment cases, the seller's pricing strategy is fixed ex-ante and the buyer's valuation does not change from one period to the next. In both cases, the seller's second-period price is conditioned on the buyer's first-period purchase decision. In the no-commitment case, though, the second-period price is ex-post optimal, while in the commitment case, it is ex-ante optimal. The ability to credibly commit to prices gives enhanced power to the seller in the transaction, and hence the seller earns greater expected profit.
Comparison with Pricing Strategies for Selling One Unit
In a survey of behavior-based price discrimination, after noting that (when δ s = δ b ) an optimal commitment strategy for the seller is Armstrong (2006) observes that "...it is a standard result in principal-agent theory that when the agent's private information does not change over time, the optimal dynamic incentive scheme repeats the optimal static incentive scheme." In a more general setting, Laffont and Martimort (2002, ch. 8) observe that in repeated adverse-selection models in which private information is constant "the optimal long-term contract is obtained in a straightforward manner as a replica of the one-shot optimal contract...". In both Armstrong and Laffont and Martimort, the principal (seller) and the agent (buyer) have the same discount factor. We show below that in our model, if the seller is more patient than the buyer then the optimal dynamic pricing policy is not a replica of the one-shot optimal pricing policy.
In our model, the buyer demands one unit in each of two periods. We compare it with two benchmark models, in each of which one unit is sold. The first comparison point is a static one-period model (model A) and the second comparison point has two periods (model B). In both models (i) the seller makes offers and the buyer accepts or rejects, (ii) the seller commits to prices, and (iii) the buyer's total demand is one unit.
As mentioned earlier, when buyer and seller discount factors are equal, an optimal pricing strategy in our model with one-unit per period demand is a repetition of the optimal price p * charged in (static) model A. The question we ask is whether there is such a close connection when discount factors are not equal. We find that when the seller is more patient than the buyer, the optimal pricing policy in our model is neither a repetition of nor a version of the optimal pricing policy in either model A or model B.
Model A: One-unit Total Demand, One Period
Because there is only one period, there is no discounting. The seller posts a price, the buyer makes his purchase decision, and there are no further moves by either player. The optimal pricing strategy in this model is the take-it-orleave price offer of p * defined in equation (2) (see Myerson 1981 and Riley & Zeckhauser 1983 ).
In our model, offering p * in each period is an optimal strategy when δ s = δ b . With an impatient seller, δ s < δ b , the optimal strategy in our model is to sell both units as a bundle at a price of (1 + δ b )p * . As the buyer's valuation for the bundle is (1 + δ b )v, the optimal strategy in our model duplicates the optimal strategy in model A applied to the bundle. In either case --δ s = δ b or δ s < δ b --the seller in our model commits not to use any information that is revealed in the first period.
A patient seller in our model, however, will commit to use information revealed in the first-period transaction. When δ s > δ b we have p 1 = p * and p 2 > p * > p n 2 : it is not optimal for the seller to commit to charge p * each period. Nor is it optimal to bundle the two units together. To see this, note that buyers separate into three intervals based on their valuations: high, intermediate and low. High valuation buyers (v > v c ) buy one unit in each period, and low valuation buyers (v < p An alternative strategy for the seller is to attempt to sell a bundle of two units in the first period, and if she is unsuccessful, then offer only one unit in the second period. This allows (intermediate-value) buyers to purchase nothing in the first period and one unit in the second period. The re-scaled Sobel-Takahashi prices, translated into our model, that support this alternate bundling strategy
. Does this version of model B pricing strategy yield the same expected profits as the prices in Proposition 1(i)? The answer is no. Recall that optimal prices in our model are unique. Therefore, as p * > 0 and optimal prices satisfy p 2 > p * > 0, priceŝ p 1 ,p 2 = 0,p n 2 can not be optimal in our model. The marginal buyer using this alternative strategy with rescaled ST prices is indifferent between buying both units in period 1 or buying only one unit in period 2, whereas the marginal buyer using Proposition 1(i) optimal prices is indifferent between buying one unit in each period or buying one unit in period 2. Thus, while the alternative strategy using two ST prices succeeds in separating buyers into three intervals, it cannot replicate the same intervals obtained using the three optimal prices (p 1 , p 2 , p n 2 ) of Proposition 1(i). Consequently, the optimal pricing policy for a patient seller in our model is neither a repetition of nor a version of the optimal pricing policy in either model A or model B. Thus, the link between optimal long-term contracts and optimal short-term contracts in repeated adverse selection models, noted by Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Armstrong (2006) among others, is severed if one drops the assumption of equal discount factors. It is not optimal for a less informed but more patient party to commit to not use in later periods information that is revealed in an earlier period.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1: The analysis divides into two cases, depending on whether or not the marginal first-period buyer buys in the second period as well. We first derive KKT conditions for each of these two cases and then apply them to prove parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the Proposition.
Because p 2 ≤ v c and, without loss of optimality p n 2 ≤ v c , a buyer with value v c is indifferent between buying in both periods or buying only in the second period. Thus, (1) becomes
The seller's profit function is
subject to the conditions
Therefore, the seller maximizes the Lagrangian
All prices and Lagrange multipliers are non-negative, and by Lemma 1(ii), p 1 > 0 and p n 2 > 0 at an optimal solution. Therefore, the KKT conditions are
Differentiating L with respect to p 1 and p n 2 and then substituting from (3) we get 
Because v c < p 2 , by (15)λ 1 = 0. Then by (13), p 2 = p * .
(i) The seller is more patient than the buyer, i.e., δ s > δ b . We first show that Case B cannot hold at any optimal solution. Noting thatλ 1 = 0, we can write (12) as
As p n 2 > 0 by Lemma 1(ii), δ s > δ b , andλ 2 ≥ 0, the fact that F is regular implies that v c > p * . But p * = p 2 , which contradicts our assumption that p 2 > v c . Thus, at any optimal solution, p 2 ≤ v c .
Next, we apply the KKT conditions for Case A. If p 2 = 0 then, as v c > 0 by Lemma 1(i), (9) implies λ 1 = 0. Next, as v c < 1, again by Lemma 1(i), we have F (v c ) < 1. But then λ 1 = 0 and F (v c ) < 1 together with (8) imply that ∂L ∂p 2 > 0. Thus, p 2 = 0 cannot be optimal. Therefore, p 2 > 0. Then (8) 
As F (v c ) < 1, we have λ 1 > 0, which together with (9) implies that p 2 = v c . Thus, as p n 2 ≤ v c , we have p 2 ≥ p n 2 .
